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218 E. Iossa, F. Stroﬀolini / Information Economics and Policy 17 (2005) 217–230the transition to an unregulated environment. This is not an easy task, for regulators
have to deal with their lack of information on the characteristics of the industries
and of the ﬁrms that operate therein. The access to this information is undoubtedly
easier for regulated ﬁrms and this explains why the economic literature on regulation
has devoted so much attention to the design of regulatory mechanisms when the ﬁrm
has private information about cost and demand conditions.
However, information acquisition is often costly also for regulated ﬁrms. Expen-
sive marketing research may be needed to learn the realization of a demand that ﬂuc-
tuates randomly, as is often the case in the service sector. Engineering and economic
research may be required to assess the operating costs of complex ﬁrms as utilities. In
unregulated markets, ﬁrms gain from expensive information gathering about cost
and demand conditions for information helps to make better decisions and thus gen-
erate higher proﬁts. In regulated markets, the ﬁrms discretion and its action set are
by deﬁnition constrained and this may severely limit the proﬁt opportunities that
better information generates. Thus, it may be misleading to presume that regulated
ﬁrms always possess precise information about cost and demand conditions. Indeed,
when discussing RPI-X regulation, Beesley and Littlechild (1989, p. 467) state:‘‘RPI-X does not assume that costs and demands are given or known: indeed,
the problem is to provide adequate incentives for the company to discover
them. The aim is to stimulate alertness to lower cost techniques and hitherto
unmet demands’’.In this paper we analyze how the information acquisition problem aﬀects the de-
sirability of introducing revenue sharing arrangements within price cap regulation.
Our motivation is twofold. First there is now a wide literature that shows how the
information acquisition problem can have an impact on the design and performance
of the regulatory mechanism. For example, Lewis and Sappington (1993) extend the
standard agency model of adverse selection to incorporate the possibility of igno-
rance and show that this calls for less discretion to the agent. Lewis and Sappington
(1997) examine how to motivate a private ﬁrm to acquire valuable information about
its cost conditions in a standard procurement model. They ﬁnd that concerns about
information management result in super-high powered contracts with pronounced
cost sharing. Cremer et al. (1998) also endogenize the information structure in a reg-
ulated environment and analyze when to induce or deter information acquisition
about costs.
While this strand of literature has produced important insights, it limits itself to
optimal mechanisms that, due to their complexity, are rarely implemented in prac-
tice. Instead, price cap regulation is widely used worldwide.
Second, in a recent paper, Iossa and Stroﬀolini (2002) show that price cap regu-
lation with downward price ﬂexibility provides weak incentives to acquire informa-
tion about costs since prices cannot fully adjust upwards. When an increase in
exogenous costs cannot be translated into higher prices for prices are capped, the
ﬁrm does not gain anything by learning about such increase. But this implies that
the ﬁrm has lower incentives to acquire information about its own costs than when
it is unregulated; and if incentives are too low, proﬁtable (and socially optimal) price
E. Iossa, F. Stroﬀolini / Information Economics and Policy 17 (2005) 217–230 219reduction will be foregone when technological conditions improve. While this prob-
lem can be at least partially resolved by raising the price cap, this is not very appeal-
ing for proﬁts would rise and higher prices would result in the presence of high costs
(i.e. when the price cap binds). Giving up price capping as a regulatory mechanism is
not particularly appealing either, because of its being a simple and easy to implement
mechanism that only requires price monitoring to ensure that it is properly enforced.
It is therefore important to ask whether some simple modiﬁcations to the pure form
of price cap regulation can help the information acquisition problem.
We show that the introduction of revenue sharing under price cap regulation,
where a fraction of revenues is rebated to consumers via lump sum transfers, can in-
crease the regulated ﬁrms incentives to acquire information. The condition required
is that the fraction of revenues retained by the ﬁrm decreases in the price it chooses.
Since higher costs are associated with higher prices and lower proﬁts, this form of
revenue sharing increases the sensitivity of proﬁts to the (exogenous) technological
conditions, which raises the value of information. This has important welfare eﬀects.
Revenue sharing increases the level of the price cap that ensures the ﬁrms participa-
tion but reduces the proﬁt-maximizing price that the ﬁrm can charge under good
technological conditions (where the price cap does not bind). This implies that rev-
enue sharing does not always lead to overall lower prices than pure price cap. How-
ever, when under pure price cap, the level of price cap needs to be increased in order
to provide incentives to acquire information, this ambiguity is resolved. Under rev-
enue sharing, prices will be lower for any given technological condition, and welfare
will be higher. Furthermore, revenue sharing does not compromise productive eﬃ-
ciency: the ﬁrm remains residual claimant of any cost reduction.
Like proﬁt sharing, revenue sharing regulation has usually been advocated for it
allows consumers to share with the ﬁrm some of the gain of production. Further-
more, as pointed out by Sappington and Weisman (1996) and Sappington (2002),
revenue sharing plans avoid some of the drawbacks of proﬁt sharing. 2 For example,
they do not reduce the regulated ﬁrms incentives to minimize its operating costs and
do not create incentives for the regulator to expropriate the ﬁrm by disallowing costs
incurred. 3 However, revenue sharing plans may reduce regulated ﬁrms incentives to
increase quality, although empirical studies do not unequivocally support this con-
clusion. 4 By showing that revenue sharing can increase eﬃciency by raising the
ﬁrms incentives to acquire information, our paper emphasizes another advantage
of revenue sharing that goes beyond redistributive concerns.2 See for example Schmalensee (1989), Gasmi et al. (1994), Lyon (1996), Mayer and Vickers (1996) for a
discussion on proﬁt sharing.
3 In the case where the fraction of revenues rebated to consumers is constant, Sappington and Weisman
(1996) also show that revenue sharing limits price discrimination and lobbying by regulated ﬁrm.
4 For example, Ai and Sappington (2002) study of the impact of incentive regulation on the quality of
service in the telecommunication industry in US during the period (1990–1996). They consider four
regimes: rate of return regulation, rate moratorium, revenue sharing and price cap, and shows no
systematic link between incentive regulation and service quality. Related contributions with mixed ﬁndings
include Banerjee (2003), Clements (2004) and Ai et al. (2004). For a review, see Sappington (2003).
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cusses the value of information to the ﬁrm while Section 3.2 compares pure price
cap regulation to price cap regulation with revenue sharing in terms of incentives
to acquire information and social welfare. Section 4 concludes. All the proofs are
in Appendix A.2 The model
We build a simple model of regulation of a single-product monopolist who aims
to maximize proﬁt; we assume away any redistributive concern on the part of the
regulator, who maximizes the sum of the net consumer surplus and proﬁt. 5
The ﬁrms realized costs are C=(be)q where q is the quantity produced, e is the
managerial eﬀort and b is a random variable representing exogenous cost conditions.
b is distributed on the interval ½b; b according to the distribution function F(b), with
density function f(b). The disutility of eﬀort (in monetary units) is w(e) with w 0>0,
w00>0, w000 P 0, for e>0 The demand function is q(p) with q 0<0 and q00=0 (for sim-
plicity), where p denotes the price. S(p) with S 0(p)=q(p) and S00(p)=q 0(p) denotes
the net consumer surplus. The regulator observes the price level but not the total
costs and the ﬁrms eﬀort.
We focus on the ﬁrms incentives to acquire costly information about its exogen-
ous cost conditions and assume that the realization of b is initially unknown to both
the regulator and the ﬁrm. However, upon expenditure of K, the ﬁrm can observe b
while information acquisition is prohibitively costly for the regulator and third par-
ties. The regulator knows the value of K but cannot observe the information acqui-
sition process, which prevents the regulator from simply instructing the ﬁrm to
acquire information.
In practice, regulated ﬁrms are required to report data about the costs of their op-
erations and it is likely that they will have some but not perfect information about
their cost conditions. Our assumption of a binary (all or nothing) information struc-
ture is made for simplicity; it is meant to capture the possibility that the ﬁrms data
do not accurately reﬂect its real cost conditions and it takes time and eﬀort for the
regulatory agency to assess this.
The assumption that the regulator can observe K can be justiﬁed when K is inter-
preted as the cost of engineering studies, for there is no asymmetry of information
about this cost. K may also depend on a variety of observable factors, such as the
size and age of the ﬁrm, which can help the regulator to derive a reliable estimate
of these information-acquisition costs.5 We make this assumption in order to focus our attention on the eﬀect that revenue sharing generates
on welfare via its impact on the ﬁrms incentives to acquire costly information, rather than because of
income distribution. As is well known, in the absence of distributional concerns on the part of the
regulator, the ﬁrst best can be achieved through direct communication between the ﬁrm and the regulator.
We rule out this possibility for it would be an artefact of our simplifying assumption. See also footnote 11.
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given a price cap P set by the regulator, the ﬁrm is free to choose any price p6 P .
Furthermore, the regulatory mechanism may provide for a fraction of the ﬁrms rev-
enue to be transferred to consumers via lump sum transfers, where this fraction can
be a function of the price the ﬁrm charges. Formally, let a(p) be the fraction of rev-
enues retained by the ﬁrm, with 0<a(Æ) 6 1 for each p. For simplicity, we restrict at-
tention to a linear function: a(p)=abp, where a2 (bp,1+bp]. In this way we can
distinguish four cases:
(1) b=0 and a=1, there is no revenue sharing.
(2) b=0 and a<1, there is revenue sharing where the fraction of revenues retained
by the ﬁrm is constant.
(3) b>0 and a=1, there is revenue sharing where the fraction of revenues retained
by the ﬁrm decreases with the price it chooses. 6
(4) b<0, and a2 (bp,1+bp], there is revenue sharing where the fraction of revenues
retained by the ﬁrm increases with the price it chooses.
Case (1) represents pure price cap regulation (PC), while cases (2)–(4) are diﬀerent
forms of price cap regulation with revenue sharing (RS). Note that, given a, higher
values of b correspond to greater levels of revenue sharing (if b is negative, this im-
plies that we are considering smaller absolute values): a(Æ) decreases in b for any p.
Given b, higher values of a represent lower levels of revenue sharing: a(Æ) increases
in a for any p.
Denote by P(b,a,b,p)=(abp)pq(p) (be(p))q(p)w(e(p)) the ﬁrms proﬁt,
where e(p) is the ﬁrms choice of eﬀort that solves w 0(e)=q(p), and let pM(b,a,b) be
the level of p that maximizes P(b,a,b,p).
When the ﬁrm is informed about the realization of b it chooses
pIðb; a; bÞ ¼ minfP ; pMðb; a; bÞg. Since pM(b,a,b) is non-decreasing in b for any
a,b, then for each price cap P and revenue sharing plan (a,b) there exists a level
of b, denoted by bM 2 ½b; b, where P ¼ pMðbM ; a; bÞ. Thus, for b<bM(Æ) an in-
formed ﬁrm charges the proﬁt-maximizing price while for b P bM(Æ) the price
cap is binding and the ﬁrm charges P . Note that bM increases with the price
cap and decreases with the proﬁt-maximizing price. Instead, when the ﬁrm is
not informed about the realization of b it chooses pN  minfP ; pMðEðbÞ; a; bÞg,
where pM(E(b),a,b) maximizes the expected proﬁt of the monopolist, with
EðbÞ ¼ R bb bf ðbÞ db.
Let Pða; b;KÞ be the optimal level of the price cap, for a given revenue sharing
plan (i.e. for given a and b, including the case of pure price cap regulation) when
the regulator wishes to induce information acquisition, thus P ða; b;KÞ solves6 In
when bfact, a=1 is not necessary when b>0; any a2 (bp,1+bp] is feasible. We focus on the case where a=1
>0 for it simpliﬁes the comparison with pure price cap regulation.
7 Se
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P
Z b
b
fV ðpIðb; a; bÞÞ þPðb; a; b; pIðb; a; bÞÞgf ðbÞ db K ðP1Þ
s:t: EbPðb; a; b; pIðb; a; bÞÞ  KP 0; ð1Þ
Pðb; a; b; pIðb; a; bÞÞP 0 for all b 2 ½b; b; ð2Þ
EbPðb; a; b; pIðb; a; bÞÞ  KPEbPðb; a; b; pN Þ; ð3Þ
pIðb; a; bÞ ¼ minfP ; pMðb; a; bÞg;where V(pI(b,a,b))=S(pI(Æ))+ [1 (abpI(Æ))]pI(Æ)q(pI(Æ)) denotes the total consumer
surplus. Constraint (1) ensures that the ﬁrm anticipates non-negative expected proﬁts
when it acquires information. Constraint (2) guarantees that, after discovering the
state of the world, the ﬁrm agrees to produce. Under (3) the ﬁrm prefers to incur
K to become informed about the realization of b rather than remaining uninformed.
In the next sections we shall consider the desirability of revenue sharing in the
presence of an information acquisition problem. We shall derive the conditions un-
der which at the solution of the above program welfare is higher when revenue shar-
ing is allowed. Thus, under such conditions the optimal regulatory mechanism allows
for revenue sharing.3 The regulatory mechanism
3.1 The value of information to the ﬁrm
Let us consider the incentives to acquire information under the standard mecha-
nism designed for the case where the ﬁrm privately observes b at no cost. Denote by
pða; bÞ the level of the price cap that solves program (P1) when we disregard the in-
formation acquisition constraints (1) and (3). At this level of price cap pða; bÞ, the
value of information to the ﬁrm is measured by the diﬀerence between the expected
proﬁts of an informed and uninformed ﬁrm when the former chooses pIðb; a; bÞ ¼
minfpða; bÞ; pMðb; a; bÞg and the latter chooses pN  minfpða; bÞ; pMðEðbÞ; a; bÞg.
For expositional simplicity, we focus on the case where pMðEðbÞ; a; bÞP pða; bÞ
and therefore pN ¼ pða; bÞ. 7 The value of information to the ﬁrm is (this expression
is derived in Appendix A)Iða; bÞ ¼
Z bM ða;bÞ
b
Z bM ða;bÞ
b
½qMðpMðs; a; bÞÞ  qðpða; bÞÞ ds dF ðbÞ; ð4Þwhere bM(a,b) solves: pða; bÞ ¼ pMðbM ; a; bÞ. First, I(a,b) increases in the level of bM.
When bP bM information about b is valueless ex post for it does not aﬀect the
ﬁrms choice (since the price cap is binding, both an informed and an ignorant ﬁrm
choose the price cap). This is because of the very nature of price cap regulation that
breaks the link between prices and costs. Second, within the range b<bM, the valuee Appendix A for the remaining case.
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b, when the ﬁrm acquires information and when it remains ignorant. Indeed the
greater this diﬀerence, the greater the sensitivity of the ﬁrms proﬁts with respect
to the technological parameter and the higher the gain from acquiring information.
It follows that a higher price cap and a lower proﬁt-maximizing price increase the
value of information.
From the above, it also follows that if I(a,b)P K, the regulatory mechanism in-
duces the ﬁrm to acquire information at the level of price cap pða; bÞ. Thus, pða; bÞ is
the solution to (P1). 8 However, for K> I(a,b), the ﬁrm prefers to remain ignorant
and never decrease the price below the price cap. This goes at the expense of consum-
ers whose welfare the regulated ﬁrm does not take into account. Consumers suﬀer
from the ﬁrms lack of incentives to acquire information for they cannot beneﬁt from
the lower prices that good cost conditions and the downward ﬂexibility of the price
cap mechanism could generate. Therefore, when K> I(a,b) it will be optimal to mod-
ify the regulatory mechanism so as to increase the ﬁrms incentives to acquire infor-
mation (unless K is so high that inducing information acquisition becomes
suboptimal). In the absence of revenue sharing, such incentives can be provided only
by raising the level of price cap and increasing the ﬁrms expected proﬁts at least pro-
portionally to K, as shown by Iossa and Stroﬀolini (2002). We now analyze whether
the introduction of revenue sharing may result in a better response to the informa-
tion acquisition problem.
3.2 Pure price cap regulation versus revenue sharing
First, consider the eﬀect of revenue sharing on the level of price cap, when we dis-
regard the information acquisition problem.
Lemma 1. Revenue sharing increases the level of price cap.
In the absence of an information acquisition problem, the optimal price cap cor-
responds to the minimum level of P that ensures the ﬁrms participation. Since the
proﬁt function is decreasing in b, Pb(b,a,b,p
I(b,a,b))= q(pI(b,a,b))<0, the price
cap pða; bÞ solves: Pðb; a; b; pða; bÞÞ ¼ 0. As some of the ﬁrms revenues are trans-
ferred to consumers, the ﬁrms proﬁt decreases for any given price; therefore the level
of price cap that ensures the ﬁrms participation increases.
The above lemma allows us to provide a suﬃcient condition for the value of in-
formation to increase when pure price cap regulation is modiﬁed so as to introduce
some form of revenue sharing.
Lemma 2. A sufficient condition for the value of information to the firm to increase
with revenue sharing is that pM(b,a,b) 6 pM (b,1,0), with strict inequality for some
b 6 bM (a,b): under RS the profit maximizing price is at most the same as under PC.8 Note that since EbP(b,a,b,p
N)>0, constraint (1) is automatically satisﬁed when (3) holds.
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proﬁt-maximizing price, bM(Æ) unambiguously rises, and there is a wider range of bs
where acquiring information is valuable ex post. Further, within this range, the dif-
ference between qM(pM(b,a,b)) and qðpða; bÞÞ is greater, which in light of (4) increases
the value of information.
Proposition 1. The necessary condition for pM(b,a,b) 6 pM(b,1,0) is b>0. For b2 (0,-
(q 0/q(p=0)))> 0, the sufficient condition is jg(pM(bM,1,0))j 6 2, where g(p) denotes
the elasticity of demand.
In order to induce the ﬁrm to charge a lower monopoly price under RS than under
PC the fraction of revenues retained by the ﬁrm must be lower the higher the price
the ﬁrm chooses. Since higher costs are associated with higher prices and lower prof-
its, this form of revenue sharing increases the sensitivity of proﬁts to the technolog-
ical conditions so as to raise the value of information. Thus, we need to focus on case
(3), where b>0 and a=1. For b2 (0,-(q 0/q(p=0))) and jg(pM(bM, 1,0))j 6 2, the re-
duction in ﬁrms retained revenues due to an increase in b is greater the higher the
price charged by the ﬁrm. 9 This makes the proﬁt maximizing price non-increasing
in b, which, in light of Lemma 2, implies that the value of information is higher un-
der RS than under PC.
Having established that RS can be designed so as to increase the value of infor-
mation, we now discuss the welfare eﬀects of revenue sharing. Let I(1,0) denote
the value of information to the ﬁrm under pure price cap regulation and consider
the case where at K= I(1,0)+ e, with e>0 and small, under pure price cap regulation
it is optimal to induce information acquisition. Formally, we assume
Assumption 1.
R b
b fV ðpIðb; 1; 0ÞÞ þPðb; 1; 0; pIðb; 1; 0ÞÞg dF ðbÞ  K is greater than
V ðpN ð1; 0ÞÞ þ R bb Pðb; 1; 0; pN ð1; 0ÞÞ dF ðbÞ.
The proposition below compares welfare under pure price cap regulation and rev-
enue sharing in the range of values of Ks where inducing information acquisition un-
der pure price cap regulation is optimal.
Proposition 2. When a=1, b2 (0,-(q 0/q(p=0))) and jgðpM ðb; 1; 0ÞÞ j6 2, there exists a
level of K, denoted by K with K > Ið1; 0Þ, such that for all K 2 ðIð1; 0Þ; KÞ price cap
regulation with revenue sharing welfare dominates pure price cap regulation.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 can be understood as follows. If K> I(1,0), un-
der PC the price cap needs to increase in order to provide incentives to acquire infor-
mation (since the higher the price cap the greater the range of b where information is
valuable ex post). 10 Then, when the conditions in Proposition 2 are satisﬁed, the value
of information to the ﬁrm is higher under RS than under PC for the same price cap.9 Due to the linear form of revenue sharing assumed here, the marginal revenue can become increasing
in price for high levels of b and jgj. The upper bound imposed on the value of the revenue sharing
parameter ensures that the second order conditions of the maximization problem of the ﬁrm are satisﬁed in
the relevant range (i.e. jg(Æ)j 6 2).
10 For a formal proof, see Iossa and Stroﬀolini (2002).
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pM(Æ)) than PC. This suggests that if it is optimal to induce information acquisition
and if the conditions in Proposition 2 are met, then RS is welfare superior to PC. 11
However, whether information acquisition is optimal depends on the value of K
and on the shape of the distribution function F(b) that aﬀects the probability that
an informed ﬁrm will choose a price lower than the price cap (this explains the upper
bound K). In industries where it is perceived that there are good technological condi-
tions or great scope for cost reductions, it will be likely that information acquisition is
optimal since it allows to capture the gain from the downward ﬂexibility of the price
cap mechanism. In these cases, RS appears a better choice than PC.
Proposition 2 focuses on the case where under PC the ﬁrm lacks suﬃcient incen-
tives to acquire information since K> I(1,0). When K< I(1,0) and therefore informa-
tion acquisition is not a problem, RS with a 0(p)<0 might still be welfare superior to
PC because of the reduction in the proﬁt-maximizing price induced by RS for low bs
(Proposition 1). In particular, the higher the probability that b falls between b and
bM, rather than in the region [bM ; b the more likely that RS is preferred to PC. This
is because of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. Second, if the increase in welfare for
b<bM is not smaller than the reduction in welfare for b>bM, a modiﬁcation of
PC with our proposed form of RS could improve welfare. 12 It is easy to show
(and this is also intuitive) that a distribution function suﬃciently skewed to the left
and with heavy tails can make RS welfare superior than PC also for K< I(1,0). Note
that the H and the G distributions satisfy this condition. With a uniform distribution
function instead a piecewise introduction of revenue sharing reduces welfare if
K< I(1,0). 13 These results suggest that in industries where there is great scope for
cost reduction and fast technological progress (like in the telecommunication indus-
try), the use of RS under price cap regulation can be desirable, regardless of whether
there is a problem of inducing the ﬁrm to acquire costly but valuable information on
cost conditions. Instead, in industries where the technological advance is slow (like in
the water industry), the desirability of introducing revenue sharing is unlikely to arise
in the absence of an information acquisition problem, that is for low values of K. In
this case the optimal price cap regulation will call for b=0 for K< I(1,0), and b>0
for K> I(1,0).11 We have assumed throughout that the regulator maximizes the sum of consumer and producer surplus.
It shouldbe clear at this stage that if the regulator hada greater concern for consumer surplus thanproﬁts, our
qualitative results would continue to hold. However, the case for revenue sharing would be stronger because
of the positive eﬀect that the lump sum transfer of revenues generates on the consumer surplus.
12 It can also be shown that the welfare eﬀects of a piecewise introduction of revenue sharing under price
cap regulation do not unambiguously depend on the values of these parameters. In particular, a reduction
of the demand elasticity generates two opposed eﬀects. On the one hand, it makes it more likely that a
piecewise introduction of revenue sharing determines a greater increase in welfare for b 6 bM with respect
to the reduction in welfare for b>bM. On the other hand, it decreases the value of bM.
13 An appendix containing the formal proofs of these points is available from the authors upon request.
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In general, proﬁt or revenue sharing arrangements are introduced in order to let
consumers share with the ﬁrm some of the gains from production. In this paper we
have provided a rationale for revenue sharing that goes beyond redistributive con-
cerns. In particular, we have shown that price cap regulation with revenue sharing,
where the fraction of revenues retained by the ﬁrm decreases in the price it chooses,
can be more eﬃcient than pure price cap regulation in the presence of an informa-
tion-acquisition problem.
It should be apparent at this stage that the form of sliding scale arrangement
proposed here is by no means the only one that can increase incentives to ac-
quire information under PC. Take for example a proﬁt sharing arrangement,
where the fraction of proﬁts retained by the ﬁrm decreases with the price it
chooses, as suggested for example by Burns et al. (1998). Like revenue sharing,
this regulatory mechanism could result in the ﬁrm choosing lower prices for low
values of the technological parameter (that is when the price cap is not binding)
and for any given level of eﬀort in cost reduction, so as to increase the range of
b where information is valuable. However, the productive ineﬃciency associated
with proﬁt sharing would generate an opposite eﬀect on prices due to the reduc-
tion in eﬀort for any given level of the technological parameter (see e.g. Mayer
and Vickers, 1996). This point, made by Iossa and Stroﬀolini (2002), suggests
that from the point of view of incentives to acquire information, revenue sharing
is preferable to proﬁt sharing. However, proﬁt sharing might be better in terms
of incentives to increase quality, as shown by Sappington and Weisman (1996)
for the case where the fraction of revenues retained by the ﬁrm is constant. A
better understanding of the trade oﬀ between incentives for quality and for infor-
mation acquisition could constitute the scope of future research.Appendix A
Derivation of expression (4)
Integrating Pbðb; pða; bÞ; a; bÞ ¼ qðpða; bÞÞ we obtain PðbMða; bÞ; pða; bÞ;
a; bÞ ¼ R bbM ða;bÞ qðpða; bÞÞ db, since Pðb; Þ ¼ 0. Then, by integrating Pb(b,pM(b,a,-
b),a,b)=q(pM(b,a,b)) and substituting for PðbMða; bÞ; pða; bÞ; a; bÞ, the proﬁts for
b<bM(a,b) arePðb; pMðb; a; bÞ; a; bÞ ¼
Z b
bM ða;bÞ
qðpða; bÞÞ dbþ
Z bM ða;bÞ
b
qMðs; a; bÞ ds;where qM(s,a,b)”q(pM(s,a,b)). Applying the same procedure yields
Pðb; pða; bÞ; a; bÞ ¼ R bb qðpða; bÞÞ ds when bP bM(a,b). Then, expression (4) follows
from the diﬀerence between the expected proﬁt of an informed ﬁrm and that of an
ignorant ﬁrm that chooses pN ¼ pða; bÞ. These are, respectively, given by
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b
Z b
bM ðÞ
qðpða; bÞÞ dbþ
Z bM ðÞ
b
qMðs; a; bÞ ds
" #
dF ðbÞ
þ
Z b
bM ðÞ
Z b
b
qðpða; bÞÞ ds dF ðbÞ;
Z b
b
Z b
b
qðpða; bÞÞ ds dF ðbÞ;where bM(Æ)”bM(a,b).
Proof ofLemma 1. LetPðb; P ; aðP ÞÞ ¼ aðP ÞPqðP Þ  ðb eðP ÞÞqðP Þ  wðeðP ÞÞbe the
ﬁrms proﬁt at b, where eðP Þ solves w0ðeÞ ¼ qðP Þ. Then, simply notice that oP=oaðP Þ ¼
PqðP Þ=Ppðb; P ; aðP ÞÞ < 0 since Ppðb; P ; aðP ÞÞ is positive for P < pM ðb; aðP ÞÞ, as is
always the case for a monopolist under price cap regulation. h
Proof of Lemma 2. Compared to pure price cap regulation, revenue sharing entails
either a higher level of b or a lower level of a. It follows that it sufﬁces to prove that
oIða; bÞ=oa < 0, oIða; bÞ=ob > 0. By differentiating (4) with respect to a and b it is
easy to show that the above conditions are equivalent to prove that
pM(b,a,b) 6 pM(b,1,0).
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the ﬁrst order condition of proﬁt maximizationbpMðb; a; bÞqMðb; a; bÞ þ aðpMðb; a; bÞÞ½pMðb; a; bÞÞq0 þ qMðb; a; bÞ
 ðb eMðb; a; bÞÞq0 ¼ 0;where qM(b,a,b)”qM(pM(b,a,b)) and eM(b,a,b) solves w 0(e)=qM(b,a,b).) h
Expression (A.1) under PC (a=1,b=0) becomespMðb; 1; 0Þq0 þ qMðb; 1; 0Þ  ðb eMðb; 1; 0ÞÞq0 ¼ 0: ðA:1ÞProvided that the proﬁt function is concave, a necessary condition for
pM(b,1,0)P pM(b,a,b) ispMðb; a; bÞq0 þ qMðb; a; bÞ  ðb eðb; a; bÞÞq0P 0: ðA:2Þ
Adding and subtracting a(pM(b,a,b))(beM(b,a,b))q 0 in (A.1)bpMðb; a; bÞqMðb; a; bÞ þ aðpMðb; a; bÞÞ½pMðb; a; bÞq0 þ qMðb; a; bÞ
 ðb eMðb; a; bÞÞq0  ð1 aðpMðb; a; bÞÞÞðb eMðb; a; bÞÞq0 ¼ 0thus, b>0 is required for (A.2) to hold
Now, let a=1,b>0 so that a(p)=1bp. Then, total diﬀerentiation of ﬁrst order
conditions yieldsopMðb; 1; bÞ
ob
¼  w
00pMðb; 1; bÞðpMðb; 1; bÞq0 þ 2qMðb; 1; bÞÞ
w00ð2q0  4bpMðb; 1; bÞq0  2bqMðb; 1; bÞÞ  ðq0Þ2that is no-greater than zero (provided that the denominator is positive by the second
order conditions of proﬁt maximization) if
14 S
w00P
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ob
¼ pMðb; 1; bÞðpMðb; 1; bÞq0 þ 2qMðb; 1; bÞÞ6 0; ðA:3Þwhere MR(b,1,b) is the marginal revenue (w.r.t. the price) of a b-ﬁrm, evaluated at
pM(b,1,b) and given byMRðb; 1; bÞ ¼ pMðb; 1; bÞq0 þ qMðb; 1; bÞ  b pMðb; 1; bÞ 2q0
 2bqMðb; 1; bÞpMðb; 1; bÞ:Under pure price cap regulation, pIðb; 1; 0Þ ¼ minfpð1; 0Þ; pMðb; 1; 0Þg and
pð1; 0Þ ¼ pMðbMð1; 0Þ; 1; 0Þ, with opMðb; 1; 0Þ=ob > 0. Thus ifo2MRðb; 1; b; pÞ
ob opM
¼ 4q0  2qMðb; 1; b; pÞP 0; ðA:4Þthat is if jg(pM(b,1,b))jP 1/2 for all pM(b,1,b), then a suﬃcient condition for (A.3) to
hold for all b is that jg(pM(bM (1,0), 1,0))j 6 2. The lemma below, discussing second
order conditions, completes the proof.
Lemma 3. In the case of a linear demand function, the range of admissible values of b
is b2 (0,-(q 0/q(p=0))); further, over this range jg(p)jP 1/2.
Proof of Lemma 3. When a(p)=1bp, with b>0, the second order conditions of the
maximization problem of the ﬁrm require 14Pppðb; 1; bÞ ¼ MRpðb; 1; bÞ ¼ 2q0  4bpMðb; 1; bÞq0  2bqMðb; 1; bÞ < 0:
Rewriting the above expression in elasticity terms and simplifying, we haveð2bpMðb; 1; bÞ  1ÞgðpMðb; 1; bÞÞ  bpMðb; 1; bÞ < 0 ðA:5Þ
which is always satisﬁed for jg(Æ)j 6 1/2. For jg(Æ)jP 1/2 (A.5) is increasing in b. Let
pmax denote the level of p such that g(pmax)=2. Then (A.5) is satisﬁed for b 6 2/
(3pmax). Let the demand function be given by q(p)=cdp, then b 6 2/(3pmax) is
equivalent to b 6 d/c”q 0/q(p=0). Finally, note that jg(Æ)j=1/2 at pmin=(1/3)(c/d),
and MR(pmin,1,b)=0 at b=d/c. Since MR is decreasing in b for jg(Æ)j 6 2 and jg(Æ)j
is increasing in p, it follows that at the proﬁt-maximizing price jg(pM(Æ))j>1/2, which
implies (A.4). h
Proof of Proposition 2. Let K^ ¼ Ið1; 0Þ For K > K^, by Assumption 1, under PC in-
formation acquisition calls for a price cap P ð1; 0;KÞ > pð1; 0Þ, where P ð1; 0;KÞ solves
(3), with oPð1; 0;KÞ=oK 6 0. Now, consider the following three cases, that diﬀer in
terms of the choice of price made by the ignorant ﬁrm.
(i) pN ¼ P under both PC and RS.
(ii) pN ¼ P under PC and pN¼pM(E(b), Æ ) under RS.econd order conditions are given by Ppp<0, Pee=w00<0 which always hold and
pp(Æ) (q 0)2>0 which holds for w00 high q 0 or small only if Ppp<0.
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Clearly, the higher the price cap, the more likely that P > pMðEðbÞ; Þ. Thus, case
(i) is likely to occur for low values of K, case (ii) for intermediate values and case (iii)
for high values.
Consider case (i). By Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, if jg(pM(bM, 1,0))j 6 2,
information acquisition under RS can be induced at pð1; bÞ < P ð1; 0;KÞ and
pI(b,1,b) 6 pI(b,1,0,K) for all b 2 ½b; b.
Now consider case (iii). Following the same procedure as for the derivation of
expression (4), the value of information to the ﬁrm for a given level of b is given byZ bM ð1;bÞ
b
Z EðbÞ
b
ðqMðs; 1; bÞÞ  qMðEðbÞ; 1; bÞÞ ds dF ðbÞ
þ
Z b
bM ð1;bÞ
Z EðbÞ
bM ð1;bÞ
ðqMðb; 1; bÞÞ  qMðEðbÞ; 1; bÞÞ db dF ðbÞ
þ
Z b
bM ð1;bÞ
Z b
bM ð1;bÞ
ðqMðEðbÞ; 1; bÞ  qðpð1; bÞÞÞ ds dF ðbÞwhich, after integration by parts, yieldsZ bM ð1;bÞ
b
ðqMðb; 1; bÞÞ  qMðEðbÞ; 1; bÞÞF ðbÞ dbþ
Z EðbÞ
bM ð1;bÞ
ðqMðb; 1; bÞÞ
 qMðEðbÞ; 1; bÞÞ dbþ
Z b
bM ð1;bÞ
ðqMðEðbÞ; 1; bÞ  qðpð1; bÞÞÞð1 F ðbÞÞ db:Diﬀerentiating the above expression with respect to b, it is easy to show that this
derivative is positive if ðo=obÞðopMðb; 1; bÞ=obÞP 0. Thus, the value of informa-
tion to the ﬁrm positively depends on the sensitivity of the proﬁt-maximizing
price function with respect to the technological parameter b over the range
½b; b. This is equal to prove that oPppðb; 1; bÞ=ob ¼ oMRpðb; 1; bÞ=obP 0 in the
relevant range (since the lower, in the absolute value, the sensitivity of the mar-
ginal revenue with respect to the price, the greater the increase in the proﬁt-max-
imizing price for any increase in marginal cost), which was shown to hold in
proof of Lemma 3.
Suﬃcient condition for case (ii) is that the result holds, when under PC we
calculate the value of information to the ﬁrm at pN=pM(E(b),Æ) rather than at
pN ¼ p (i.e. at the optimal level of pN). Then, by the proof of case (iii) the result
follows.
Finally, note that as K rises, the expected welfare when the ﬁrm acquires
information decreases, while the expected welfare when the ﬁrm does not acquire
information remains constant. This suggests that there will be a value of K > K^
denoted by K1, above which inducing information acquisition is no longer optimal.
Further, there exists a value of K > K^ denoted by K2, where the constraint b 6 q 0/
q(p=0) binds. Thus, K ¼ min½K1;K2. h
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